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Abstract. This study aims to analyze the influence of ownership structure on dividend policy 
in non- financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 
2009-2013. The theoretical framework applied to analyze this research model is the theory 
of agency that is based on the existence of agency correlation, as the result of the separation 
of ownership and management performed by the manager. Tested ownership structure 
covers to largest shareholders, institutional shareholders and individual shareholders. 
Hypothesis testing is conducted by using a multiple regression models with a sample of
149 observations of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during the period of 2009-2013 that have a constant profit during that period. The study 
provides empirical evidence consisting of: (1) largest shareholders are positively correlated 
and significant on dividend policy, (2) institutional shareholders are positively correlated 
and significant on dividend policy, (3) individual shareholders are negatively correlated 
and significant on dividend policy, (4) ratios, such as return of assets, firm size, and firm 
age, have significant effect on dividend policy.
Keywords: dividend policy, individual shareholder, institutional shareholder, ownership
structure.
Introduction
A dividend is one of the considerations 
that make a person/corporation decide to 
invest in a certain company. A dividend is 
the distribution of profit of a company to its 
shareholders (Sartono, 2001). Thus, each 
shareholder will receive a dividend of their 
shareholding in accordance with the dividend 
payment policy that has been set by the 
company. The dividend is given in the form 
of cash (cash dividend) and stock. The cash 
dividend is more attractive to investors as it is 
the main return that will determine the value 
of shares for the owner of the investor. For 
that reason, every companies have always 
had a goal to make profits from the various 
aspects of their business, either producing 
goods or provide services (Fatimatuzahra and 
Kusumastuti, 2016) including privately owned 
companies which have small and medium 
size (SME’s), not only producing profit but 
also strengthening their position in terms of 
competitive advantage to face the ASEAN 
Economic Community (Sutopo, 2016).
According to Brigham and Houston 
(2001), the distribution of dividend made by 
the company shows the liquidity level of the 
company, in addition, it serves to maximize 
the company’s share price. A manager, as 
the authority recipient of the owner of the 
company should define policies that can 
improve the value of interests of shareholders 
that is maximizing the company’s stock 
price. Dividend payout policy is one of the 
important decisions made by the company, 
as it relates to the investment planning in the 
future. Therefore, a company that will pay 
the dividends are faced with a wide range of 
considerations, among others: the need to 
withhold a portion of profits for re-investment 
that may be more profitable, the financing 
needs, the liquidity of the company, the nature 
of shareholders, certain targets relating to 
the dividend payout ratio, and other factors 
associated with the dividend policy.
The background of this study using 
dividend payout ratio (DPR) as the dependent 
variable is that Parliament essentially 
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determines the portion of profits to be 
distributed to shareholders, and which will be 
retained as part of retained earnings. Miller 
and Modigliani have developed irrelevant 
dividend, which is then followed by several 
studies that discuss the payment of dividends 
and variations in dividend payment policy by 
focusing on market imperfections. Brigham 
(2006) also says that managers believe that 
investors prefer companies that follow a stable 
dividend payout ratio.
One of the most cited reasons why 
companies pay dividends is the hypothesis 
of Free Cash Flow or commonly abbreviated 
as FCF, which is based on the idea that there 
is a conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders. Instead of taking action 
in the interests of shareholders, managers 
may allocate the company’s resources for 
their own benefits. Therefore, FCF is able to 
create agency problem because FCF can be 
used to fund a number of projects that are 
less profitable. To solve this agency problem, 
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) in 
Thanatawee (2013), suggest to restoring the 
company’s FCF to the shareholders by paying 
a dividend. Easterbrook (1984) in Thanatawee 
(2013) argues that the dividend is required 
to raise more frequent external funds, and 
thus, can be further monitored by the external 
parties. According to Jensen (1986), dividend 
reduces the amount of cash that may be 
wasted by the managers. Accordingly, the 
dividend can be used as a kind of mechanism 
to reduce the agency cost. This becomes the 
background of the use of Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
as the control variable in this study.
Signaling theory, that was first developed 
by Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979) in 
Kusuma (2004), states that market has 
sufficient information related to the company’s 
activities. One of which is associated with 
the dividend that basically explains that 
the dividend is utilized by managers to 
provide a signal regarding the prospects 
of the company’s performance, therefore, 
the increase/decrease of the dividend is 
considered to have a charge of information 
about the positive/negative prospects of 
the company’s performance. The market 
reacts positively/negatively to the increase/ 
decrease in dividends. Dividend payments is 
a signal for external investors referred to the 
prospects of a company in the future. Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) argue that an increase 
in the dividend beyond normal is a signal 
to investors implying that the company’s 
management has good expectations in the 
future. A dividend reduction is considered as 
a signal of “difficulties” in the future.
Agency theory developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) basically explains that 
dividend serves as a means of monitoring 
the behavior of management, and, therefore, 
it contributes to minimizing the agency cost 
arising from a potential conflict of interest/ 
agency conflict between shareholders (the 
company owners) and agents (managers). 
Based on this idea, the market will react 
positively/negatively on the increase or 
decrease of dividends. Meanwhile, the 
agency cost is the cost emerging in order to 
control or monitor the actions of managers 
to comply with the basic interests. The basis 
of the agency cost model is when managers 
consciously are not able to take actions in 
accordance with the interests of investors/ 
shareholders, consequently, the shareholders 
use certain mechanisms to control the actions 
of the managers. One of those actions is 
through dividend payment with a high payout.
The occurrence of agency conflict 
cannot be separated from the influence 
of the ownership structure. In a company 
that has a dominant particular ownership 
structure, subsequently, the company will 
have its own interest that is beneficial for 
that dominant ownership structure. The 
structures of share ownership in a public 
company include institutional ownership and 
individual ownership. Institutional ownership 
consists of the ownership of shares owned 
by the government, financial institutions, 
corporations, foreign institutions, trust funds, 
and other institutions. Individual ownership is 
the ownership of each individual on the shares 
of a company (Thanatawee, 2013).
Although there is a lot of empirical 
e vide nce on the corr e la tion  be twe e n 
ownership structure and dividend in the US 
and other developing countries that has been 
documented, there is still a lack of literature 
such as the problem of the market in developing 
countries, chiefly, in Indonesia. Indonesian 
capital market offers an attractive atmosphere 
to explore this issue for several reasons. First, 
Asia, including Indonesia, is characterized as 
a country with low shareholder protection as 
well as the ownership structure of Indonesian 
corporates that is highly concentrated (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Second, it is recorded 
that the companies in East Asia, including 
Indonesia, are partially owned and controlled 
by individuals, families, and related partners 
(Claessens et al., 2000). These characteristics 
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can increase the agency cost, FCF, while 
the dividend payment is more likely to be 
used as a mechanism that helps to reduce 
the institutional problems. Furthermore, 
Limpaphayom and Ngamwuttikul (2004) 
in Thanatawee (2013) state that, Thailand 
stock companies are owned by five biggest 
shareholders, the majority is held by 
institutions holding 27% substantial average 
of the total outstanding share.
This research needs to be completed 
because most research with similar theme has 
been conducted for countries with advanced 
markets, especially the United States. Only a 
few studies have been conducted on markets 
in developing countries, such as Thailand 
(Thanatawee, 2013). In that study, it is said that 
the institutional differences between these two 
countries include the corporate management 
system between Thailand and developed 
country. However, there is no indication 
whether the differences in the practice of 
institutional governance, regulation, and the 
company, are included into the differences 
of the correlation between ownership and 
corporate dividend. This research will try 
to correctly answer the questions by using 
the framework of the simultaneous equation 
to study the characteristics of the correlation 
between ownership as indicated by the board 
ownership (shareholding percentage owned 
by the board members) and the dividend 
policy.
Empirical Evidence
Thanatawee (2013) conducted a study 
entitled “Ownership Structure and Dividend 
Policy: Evidence from Thailand”. This journal 
aims to test whether there is an empirical 
correlation between the ownership structure 
of the company’s dividend policy. In analyzing 
the data, this journal uses three models 
of computation. These models include: 
Descriptive Statistics, Logit Regressions, 
Tobit Regressions, and Possible Endogeneity 
Test. Likewise, these four models are used for 
the data processing of this study. They are 
expected to show the correlation between the 
two main concepts studied.
The result of that previous research 
indicates two points of conclusion. The first 
point reveals that companies in Thailand 
have extremely high concentrated ownership 
structure and mostly owned by institutions. 
Through the control variables including ROA, 
SIZE, and RETE, this has positive effects on 
the dividend policy as well as on the Dividend 
Payout Ratio (DPR). The Dividend Payout Ratio 
was also found to have positive effects on MTB 
but have negative effects on LEV. Meanwhile, 
FCF does not have a significant correlation 
to the dividend policy of the companies in 
Thailand. The second point reveals that the 
higher concentration of ownership as an 
institution, compared to the individual, the 
highest ownership would rather pay dividend 
and have positive relation with the DPR. 
Additionally, whether the dividend is paid or 
not, and whether the Dividend Payout Ratio 
is high and low, it is more controlled by the 
higher concentration of ownership of the 
domestic institutions/individuals rather than 
foreign institutions/individuals.
Suwendra Kumar (2007) conducted 
a study entitled “Analysis of The Effects of 
Ownership Structure, Investment Opportunity 
Set (IOS), and Financial Ratios on Dividend 
Payout Ratio (DPR)”. The purpose of the 
study is to test two agents based on the 
hypothesis regarding the effects of ownership 
concentration on dividend policy by using 
a large sample of Japanese companies. 
In analyzing the data, it applies three 
models of computation, namely, Payout 
Regressions, Endogeneity of Ownership, and 
Dividend Change Regressions to measure 
the correlation between variables. It aims 
to determine how far is the influence of the 
ownership structure, investment opportunity 
set (IOS), and financial ratios such as return 
on assets (ROA) and debt to equity ratio 
(DER) on the dividend payout ratio (DER) 
in companies with foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and in companies with domestic capital 
investment (DCI). In analyzing the data, 
it only uses one calculation model, that is 
multiple regression. This model will also be 
applied in this study for the data processing.
In that thesis, there are two points of 
conclusion; first, on the domestic investment 
companies, it is only ROA affecting DPR 
significantly; therefore, ROA should be 
maintained, since it becomes the most 
dominant concern and affects the DPR. 
Furthermore, the second point is that on 
the foreign investment companies, the 
management stock ownership, IOS, ROA, 
and DER significantly influence DPR, thus, the 
scale of the management stock ownership, 
IOS, ROA, and DER should be maintained to 
attract investors.
Research Method
To observe the effect of ownership 
structure on dividend policy in the companies 
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listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange during 
2009-2013, this study applies three types 
of variables. The first is bound or dependent 
variable. The dependent variable in this study 
is the dividend payout ratio (DPR). The second 
one is the control variable. Control variables in 
this study are the return on assets, free flow 
cast, firm size, market to book ratio, leverage, 
retained earnings to equity, and firm age. Then 
the last one is free variable or the independent 
variable. The independent variables in this 
study are the largest shareholder, institutional 
shareholder and individual shareholder. To 
follows (Nachrowi and Usman, 2006): see the 
effect of the correlation, the analysis model 
is used to process these three variables with a 
mathematical model as follows:
Where:
Source: Thanatawee (2013)
Description:
DPR : Dividend Payout Ratio
TOP : Largest Shareholder
INST : Institutional Shareholder 
INDV : Individual Shareholder ROA : Return 
of Assets
FCF : Free Cast Flow
SIZE : Firm Size
MTB : Market to Book Ratio
LEV : Leverage
RETE : Retained Earnings to Equity
AGE : Firm Age
Research Hypothesis
H : The ownership structure does not 
significantly affect the dividend policy on non- 
financial companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in the period of 2009-2013.
H : The ownership structure significantly 
affects the dividend policy on non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in the period of 2009-2013.
Panel Data Analysis Technique
G i v en  that  the  panel  data  i s  a 
combination of cross-section data and time 
series data, then, the model is written as
10
0
1
N x T = amount of panel data
To estimate the parameter of the model 
with panel data, there are some techniques 
suggested, i.e.: Pooled Leasr Square, Fixed 
Effect Method (FEM), and Random Effect 
Method (REM). In choosing which model that 
would be used, the Chow Test and Hausmann 
Test are performed. Chow Test is a test in order 
to choose the model approach that should be 
applied in accordance with the equation model 
used, whether the pooled least squares or the 
fixed effect. While in choosing which approach 
that fits the model equation between the fixed 
effect and random effect, the specifications 
developed by Hausman can be used. The 
Hausman Test applies Chi Square value, so 
that the method selection decision of the 
panel data can be determined statistically.
Panel Data Analysis
Descriptive statistical analysis can be 
used to determine the characteristics and 
the rationality of the observation data used 
for each research variable. The following 
table shows the descriptive statistics, i.e. 
mean, maximum value, minimum value, 
and the standard deviation of the variables 
in the equation evaluating the effects of the 
ownership structure on dividend policy of the 
research sample data presented in  Appendix
1. The research variables are the 
ownership structure (TOP, INST, and INDV), 
the dividend policy (DPR), and the financial 
ratios (ROA, FCF, SIZE, MTB, LEV, RETE, AGE).
Table 2 indicates the multicollinearity 
test using matrix correlation method which 
aims to test whether the regression model is 
correlated with the independent variables. The 
effective regression model should not emerge 
any correlation among the independent 
variables (Ghozali, 2009). Multicollinearity is 
the condition indicating the existence of the 
correlation among the independent variables. 
If the case of multicollinearity appears, 
the research will not work. To analyze the 
presence or the absence of multicollinearity, 
the correlation coefficient of each independent 
variable should be observed. If the correlation 
coefficient among each independent variable 
is greater than 0.8, then, the multicollinearity 
occurs.
The result of the correlation analysis 
using the correlation matrix above indicates 
a perfect correlation that has a negative 
value or opposite orientation. The perfect 
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correlation occurs between INST variable 
and INDV variable. In addition, the perfect 
correlation has a significance level at α =
1%. This indicates that between the 
INST variable and INDV variable, there is a 
very strong and perfect association, in other 
words, by knowing the value of the INST 
variable, therefore, the value of INDV variable 
also can be identified, and vice versa.
A s m entioned e a rlie r tha t if the 
multicollinearity problem arises, the research 
will be not working. This happens because 
in order to be able to do the multiple linear 
regression model test, there should not be 
any symptom of multicollinearity on the 
independent variable. Therefore, one of the 
independent variables having the symptom 
of multicollinearity must be removed, in this 
case, it might be the INST variable or INDV 
variable. In order to able to continue the 
research and examine the multiple linear 
regression models, I (we) chose to eliminate 
the INST variable and kept using the INDV 
variables. The explanation about this will be 
proved at the section of result analysis.
Table 3 shows the result of Chow Test 
proving that this study applies the panel 
data of Pooled Least Square, that refers to 
the cross-section data with time series (pool 
data) which are then combined and treated as 
one observation entity used to estimate the 
model with Ordinary Least Square method. 
Table 4 shows the result of the regression 
using Pooled Least Square method.
Table 3. Result of Chow Test
Redundant Fixed Effects
Tests
Equat ion:  POOLED _ EQUETION
Test cross-section fixed effects
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. Cross-
section F     1.054561     (148,587) 0.3314
Cross- section
Chi-square 175.650222 148          0.0600
Source: Data Processing by Using Eviews 8.1 (2015)
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of The Research Variables
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
DPR 0,5856 0,0000 135,04 0,0000 6,05069
TOP 0,5022 0,51 0,9867 0,0873 0,21803
INST 0,6895 0,7172 0,9939 0,1011 0,18747
INDV 0,3104 0,2828 0,8989 0,0061 0,18747
ROA 0,1230 0,0943 0,8715 0,0001 0,10574
FCF 0,1278 0,0837 23,9001 -0,4212 0,88063
SIZE 12,2400 12,2008 14,3304 9,4860 0,71329
MTB 4,2756 1,4153 203,9964 -93,49 15,26139
LEV 0,5267 0,4977 6,50 0,04 0,38308
RETE 0,3935 0,5313 71,21 -65,02 3,84033
AGE 1,4909 1,5185 2,1959 0,7782 0,22776
Source: Data Processing by Using Eviews 8.1 (2015)
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The T-Test shows how independent one 
independent variable is, including the largest 
shareholder (TOP), institutional shareholder 
(INST), individual shareholder (INDV), 
dividend policy (DPR), and the financial 
ratios of the company (ROA, FCF, SIZE, MTB, 
LEV, RETE, AGE) in describing the variation 
of the dependent variables, in this case, the 
Dividend Pay Out Ratio (Ghozali, 2006). This 
test is conducted to test whether individually, 
(each of) the independent variables have a 
significant effect on the dependent variables. 
Besides, T-Test is an examination of the 
regression coefficient of each independent 
the variable on the dependent variable to 
determine how significant the influence of 
Table 2. Analysis of Result of Correlation Matrix
AGE DPR FCF INDV INST LEV MTB RETE ROA SIZE TOP
AGE 1.0000 0.2283 -0.0507 -0.0605 0.0605 -0.0831 -0.0835 0.0239 0.1973 0.2555 0.1364
DPR 0.2283 1.0000 -0.0387 -0.3026 0.3026 -0.0495 -0.0613 0.0188 -0.0654 0.1968 0.2711
FCF -0.0507 -0.0387 1.0000 -0.0356 0.0356 0.0592 -0.2150 0.6766 0.0491 -0.1231 -0.0037
INDV -0.0605 -0.3026 -0.0356 1.0000 -1.0000 -0.0601 0.0166 -0.0359 -0.1293 0.0553 -0.5785
INST 0.0605 0.3026 0.0356 -1.0000 1.0000 0.0601 -0.0166 0.0359 0.1293 -0.0553 0.5785
LEV -0.0831 -0.0495 0.0592 -0.0601 0.0601 1.0000 -0.0733 0.1289 0.0155 -0.1668 -0.0525
MTB -0.0835 -0.0613 -0.2150 0.0166 -0.0166 -0.0733 1.0000 -0.3012 0.0895 0.0258 -0.0511
RETE 0.0239 0.0188 0.6766 -0.0359 0.0359 0.1289 -0.3012 1.0000 0.0791 0.0210 0.0461
ROA 0.1973 -0.0654 0.0491 -0.1293 0.1293 0.0155 0.0895 0.0791 1.0000 0.0814 0.2895
SIZE 0.2555 0.1968 -0.1231 0.0553 -0.0553 -0.1668 0.0258 0.0210 0.0814 1.0000 0.1461
TOP 0.1364 0.2711 -0.0037 -0.5785 0.5785 -0.0525 -0.0511 0.0461 0.2895 0.1461 1.0000
Source: Data Processing by Using Eviews 8.1 (2015)
Table 4 Regression Result Using Pooled Least Square Model
Dependent Variable: DPR Method: Panel Least Squares Sample: 2009 2013
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 149
Total panel (balanced) observations: 745
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -4.084255 0.816264 -5.003593 0.0000
TOP 0.790235 0.266808 2.961810 0.0032
INDV -1.794526 0.296874 -6.044732 0.0000
ROA -2.323404 0.452614 -5.133306 0.0000
FCF -0.050628 0.070084 -0.722385 0.4703
SIZE 0.286735 0.067524 4.246423 0.0000
MTB -0.001964 0.003111 -0.631198 0.5281
LEV -0.061093 0.119901 -0.509527 0.6105
RETE 0.010060 0.016468 0.610875 0.5415
AGE 1.106070 0.207509 5.330223 0.0000
R-squared 0.199063 Mean dependent var 0.585567
Adjusted R-squared 0.189256 S.D. dependent var 1.345513
S.E. of regression 1.211518 Akaike info criterion 3.234957
Sum squared resid 1078.815 Schwarz criterion 3.296882
Log likelihood -1195.021 Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.258825
F-statistic 20.29724 Durbin-Watson stat 2.335271
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Source: Data Processing by Using Eviews 8.1 (2015)
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the independent variables on the dependent 
variables.
Based on the Table 4 above, it is shown 
that the probability of the significance of 
the independent variables, both, TOP and 
INDV has significant value, that is 0.0032 for 
the  TOP variable and 0.0000 for the INDV 
variable. In addition, of the control variables 
that exist in this study, the variables of return 
on assets (ROA), firm size (SIZE), and firm 
age (AGE) also have a significant value or 
p-value ≤ α, i.e. respectively 0.0000 each.
Whereas, the other control variables 
such as free cash flow (FCF), market-to-book 
ratio (MTB), leverage (LEV), and retained 
earnings to equity (RETE), are not significant.
Table 4 also shows the phenomenon 
of agency cost indicating the association 
between the shareholdings and the dividend 
policy made by the company manager (Audita, 
2014). The result of this study indicates 
the direction of the correlation of each 
independent variable (ownership structure) 
on the dependent variable (dividend policy). 
In TOP variable, there is a positive correlation 
on the DPR variable, while the INDV variable 
has negative correlation. This means that the 
largest external shareholding in the company 
will be beneficial for reducing the agency 
problem. The majority of the shareholders can 
perform its function to oversee the policies 
and activities of the manager without bringing 
up a conflict of interest among the holders 
of the share blocks. The managers will not 
be able to freely determine their interests 
for the management purposes only. This is 
also in accordance with Truong and Heaney 
(2007), that when a non-insider shareholder 
of a significant share, the company will be 
more pleased to offer dividend, especially if 
the profitability condition of the company is 
high with small debt.
This condition is certainly opposed to the 
individual shareholder variable (INDV), which 
has a negative correlation with the dividend 
policy (DPR). This condition contrasts with 
the largest shareholder (TOP). An individual 
shareholder is usually characterized by the 
managerial ownership, which means, the 
more proportionate the share in a company, 
the more the potential of agency conflict 
emerges. By realizing the negative association 
of the INDV variable on DPR, then, it can be 
identified that INST variable has a positive 
correlation, because, both, the variables of 
INST and INDV have perfect multicollinearity 
in the opposite direction. This made me (us) 
discard the individual shareholder variable 
(INDV) in the early part of this research 
model testing. The result of this research 
indicates that the correlation between 
institutional shareholder and dividend policy 
also reinforces the statement saying that there 
is a tendency, that the larger the institutional 
shareholder, the more the company pays the 
taxes (Grinstein, Y., & Michaely, R, 2005).
Furthermore, the financial ratios used 
as the control variables, i.e. the variables of 
ROA, FCF, MTB, and LEV, have a negative 
correlation with the DPR variable. The 
negative correlation of ROA on DPR contracts 
with what is proposed by Thanatawee (2013), 
whereas for the negative correlation of FCF, 
MTB, and LEV is in line with that proposed by 
Thanatawee (2013). Furthermore, a positive 
correlation can be found in the variables of 
SIZE, RETE, and AGE on DPR. This is in line 
with Thanatawee (2013) indicating a positive 
association among SIZE, RETE, and AGE on 
DPR. The positive correlation between AGE 
and DPR is in accordance with the theory 
stating that if the age of a company is getting 
higher, then the company should be well- 
established.
Conclusions
Generally, this study is conducted 
to observe whether there is an influence 
between the ownership structure on the 
company’s dividend policy in non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange of 2009-2013 period. The result 
of this study indicates that the ownership 
structure, proxied by the variables of largest 
shareholder, institutional shareholder and 
individual shareholder, has a significant effect 
on dividend policy, in which, the variables 
of largest shareholder and institutional 
shareholder have a positive correlation on 
the dividend policy, while the individual 
shareholder has a negative correlation on the 
dividend policy.
However, of a number of present control 
variables, there are only the variables of 
Return on Assets, Firm Size, and Firm Age that 
have a significant influence on dividend policy, 
in which the variable of Return on Assets has 
a negative correlation on the dividend policy, 
moreover, the variables of Firm Size and Firm 
Age have positive correlation on dividend 
policy. Furthermore, there is no significant 
effect of the variables of Free Cash Flow, 
Market to Book Ratio, Leverage, and Retained 
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Earnings to Equity, on dividend policy.
As a suggestion, the issuers should pay 
more attention to the capital structure by 
considering whether they have to use their 
own capital or use long-term liabilities. This is 
due to the use of these two sources that have 
different capital cost implications. The size of 
the capital costs will affect the profitability, 
which in turn, will affect the dividend policy of 
the company. For the investors, the company’s 
ability to give dividend is a prospect in the 
future. This is a positive signal implying 
that the issuers are the eligible entity to be 
considered as an investment agent.
References
Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F. Houston. 
(2001). Manajemen Keuangan, Edisi 8. 
Jakarta: Erlangga.
Brigham, E. F., and Houston, J. F. (2006).
Dasar-Dasar Manajemen Keuangan. The 
Second Book. The 10th  book. Jakarta : 
Salemba Empat.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. 
(2000). “The separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations”, 
Journal of Financial Economics.
Fatimatuzahra, Miaz., Kusumastuti, Retno. 
(2016). “Determinant of Working Capital 
Management of Manufacturing Companies, 
MIMBAR Volume 32, No 2., Year 2016.
Grinstein, Y.,  &  Mi chael y,  R .  (2005). 
“Institutional holdings and payout policy” 
Journal of Finance.
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling W. H. (1976), 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure”, 
Journal of Financial Economics.
Kusuma, Hadri. (2004), “Hubungan Dividen 
Inis iasi  dan Informasi Asimetris: 
Pendekatan Hazard Rate”, Journal Siasat 
Bisnis, Vol. 1., No. 9.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.,
& Vishny, R. W. (2000). “Agency Problems 
and Dividend Policies Around The World”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol 55, Issue 1.
Miller, M. H., dan Modigliani, F. (1961). 
“Dividend Pol icy, Growth, and The 
Valuation of Shares”, The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 34, No. 4.
Nachrowi, D., and  Hardius Usman. (2006).
Pe n de ka ta n  Popu le r  da n  Pr a kt is 
Ekonometrika Untuk Analisis Ekonomi dan 
Keuangan. Jakarta: Publishing Office of 
Faculty of Economy Universitas Indonesia.
Ross, Stephen. A. (1977), “The Determination 
of Financial Structure: The Incentive- 
Signalling Approach.”, The Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 8., No. 1.
Sartono,   A. (2001). Long Term Financing 
Decision: Views and Practicies of Financial 
Managers of   Listed Public Firms in 
Indonesia. Gadjah Mada International
Journey of Business 3.
Suwendra Kumar (2007), Analisis Pengaruh 
Struktur  Kepemi l i kan,  Investment 
Opportunity Set (IOS), Thesis., Program 
Pascasarjana, Universitas Diponegoro.
Sutopo, D. (2016). “Vitality of Village UMKM in 
the Arena of ASEAN Econimic Community, 
MIMBAR, Volume 32, No. 2., Desember 
Year 2016.
Thanatawee, Y. (2013). “Ownership Structure 
and Dividend Policy: Evidence from 
Thailand”, International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 5 No. 1.
Truong, T., & Heaney, R. (2007), “Largest 
Shareholder and Dividend Policy Around 
The World”, The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, vol. 47, No. 5.
